Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Larry Helquist : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig Halls; Attorney for Respondent.
Rosalie Reilly; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Helquist, No. 950665 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6899

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UT-fl- "
DCi. .KFU

59
.A10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APWSttS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Respondent,

K P QSQU»bS-CA

Case No.: 950665-CA
Priority No.: 2

vs.
LARRY HELQUIST,
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
WITH A MINOR IN THE VEHICLE, A CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (b) , IN THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE LYLE R.
ANDERSON PRESIDING.
ROSALIE REILLY
148 South Main #9
Post Office Box 404
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-3266
Attorney for Petitioner
CRAIG HALLS
297 South Main
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2128
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
APR o 9 1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

il

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF CASE

1

A.
B.

NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1
2

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

3

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
1. THE TROOPERS SEIZED MR. HELQUIST
WITHOUT HAVING A REASONABLE,
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT
A. The dispatch report was
conclusory and was not
supported by Trooper Hall's
personal observations

7

B. The troopers exceeded the
scope of any permissible detention
2.
CONCLUSION

THE TROOPER'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED
A DE FACTO ARREST

7

7
...

12
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
PAGE
A.

FEDERAL CASES:

Dunawav v. Mew York, 442 U.S. 200,
60 L.Ed. 824, 833, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) . .

13-17

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
75 L.Ed. 229, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) . . . .
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,
20 L.Ed 2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)

13

...

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
64 L.Ed.2d 497, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980)

9, 11

. .

12

United Stated v. Merritt. 736 P.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).
16
Wona Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471,
833 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) . . .
B.

14, 17

STATE CASES:

Layton City v. Noon. 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987) .

12

Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) .

15

Sandv City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989)
7
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . .
State v. Chapman.

P.2d

9, 10

,

272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995)

3

State v. Dietman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)

.

State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

16
7, 12

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994) . . .

3

State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994)

...

3

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) . . .

14, 17

ii.

State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
14
State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992)

. . . .

10, 11

RULES AND STATUTES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 5

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26 (2) (c)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1) (3) (a) (ii) (B)

1, 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const., Amend. IV

14, 17

Utah Const., Article I, Section 14

14, 17

Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
Findings of Fact

iii.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Respondent,

:
::
:

Case No.:

95Q665-CA

Priority No.: 2

vs.
LARRY HELQUIST,
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to this
CourtTs order, dated December 7, 1995, allowing the interlocutory
appeal.

Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-35-26 (2) (c) (1953 as amended) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Petitioner, Larry Helquist, is charged with Driving Under

The Influence, a class "A" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44 (1)(3)(a)(ii)(E) (1953 as amended).
This appeal is from the trial court's order, dated October
2, 1995, denying Defendant's suppression motion.

The trial court

was the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1.

On June 7, 1995, Mr. Helquist was charged in an

Information with Driving Under the Influence, a class "A"
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(3) (a) (ii) (b) .
2.

On July 7, 1995, Mr. Helquist was arraigned and entered

a plea of not guilty.
3.

On July 31, 1995, Mr. Helquist filed a motion to

suppress evidence. A copy of that motion is contained in
Addendum B.
4.

On September 5, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was held on

Mr. Helquistfs motion to suppress evidence.
5.
denied.

On October 2, 1995, the motion to suppress evidence was
A copy of the District Courtfs Findings of Fact is

contained in Addendum C.
6..

On October 23, 1995, Mr. Helquist filed a Petition for

Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order.
7. On December 7, 1995, the Petition for Permission to
Appeal from the Interlocutory Order was granted by this Court.
2

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
The District Court has stayed proceedings pending the

outcome of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1)

Did the troopers seize Mr, Helquist without reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot?
A.

Did the dispatch report provide a sufficient factual

basis?;
B.

Did the troopers exceed the scope of any permissible

detention?; and
C.

Did the troopers' actions constitute an arrest without

probable cause?
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion made by
the trial court are to be broadly reviewed for correctness, with
the Appellate Court affording a measure of discretion to the
trial court in the application of the correctness standard.
State v. Chapman,

P.2d

, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah

1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
Legal determinations regarding probable cause are to be
reviewed for correctness conveying some discretion to the trial
court.

State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Helquist was stopped by troopers after the San Juan
County Sheriff's

Dispatch received an anonymous call from an

employee at Blue Mountain Foods who reported a "drunk driver",
stating that a male who smelled strongly of alcohol had been in
an argument, left the store and was seen in a small red car.
5, 6, 13)

(R.

There was no testimony regarding the time between when

the call was received by dispatch and when the law enforcement
arrived at the scene other than Trooper Halls1 statement that it
was "not that long".

(R. 13)

Trooper Randall and a ride-along

initially responded to the call and drove by Blue Mountain Foods.
(R. 6)

Trooper Randall testified that there was only one red car

in the parking lot at that time.

(R. 6)

When Trooper Randall turned around to go back to Blue
Mountain Foods, his vehicle became stuck in a snowdrift and
Trooper Halls, at Trooper Randall's request,
report.

(R. 6-7)

responded to the

Trooper Halls stopped up the street from Blue

Mountain Foods and watched Mr. Helquist as walked to a small red
car, got in, backed out of the parking stall and headed toward
the street.

(R. 13)

There was no testimony that Trooper Halls

observed anything unusual about Mr. Helquist1s gait or that Mr.1
Helquist had any problems operating the vehicle.

4

Trooper Halls stopped the vehicle before it left the parking
lot,

(R. 13)

Trooper Halls asked the Mr. Helquist to get out

of the car and noticed that he smelled strongly of alcohol and
had somewhat slurred speech.

(R. 14 ) A short time later,

Trooper Randall arrived and smelled a strong odor of alcohol on
Mr. Helquist.

(R. 8)

Trooper Randall questioned Mr. Helquist

about the consumption of alcohol and discussed with him the
decision to transport him to the public safety building for the
field sobriety tests and during the field sobriety test,
discussed some of his medical conditions.

(R. 7, 8, 9)

Randall characterized Mr. Helquistfs speech as good.

Trooper

(R. 10)

Trooper Randall told Mr. Helquist to get into his police
vehicle as he was going to be transported to the public safety
building for a field sobriety test. Mr. Helquist objected.
8, 33)

(R.

Trooper Randall stated that the reason for having the

field sobriety test done at the public safety building was due to
the weather conditions:

it was a snowy night and he wanted to

make sure the test was performed under fair conditions.

(R. 8)

Trooper Halls stayed with the vehicle until the troopers
determined what to do with the it.

(R. 35, 49) After the field

sobriety tests, Trooper Randall called Trooper Halls and told him
to call a wrecker and impound the vehicle.

5

(R. 35)

Trooper Randall had filled out the DUI report form which
indicated that the search of the vehicle was conducted at the
place of arrest.
Mountain Foods.

(R. 29)
(R. 30)

The place of arrest was listed as Blue
The time of arrest was listed on the

report as 5:30 and the stop was supposed to have taken place at
the same time.

(R. 31)

The Court took judicial notice that the public safety
building was five blocks away from the stop and that there were
other places where the field sobriety test could have been
performed.

(R. 46)

\
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court incorrectly concluded that there was
sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr.
Helquist.

The arresting officers relied on the conclusory

dispatch report and never observed any driving pattern which
would corroborate the allegation that Mr. Helquist was an
impaired driver.

Furthermore, the troopers exceeded any

permissible detention by transporting Mr. Helquist to the public
safety building for the field sobriety test.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that putting Mr.
Helquist in the patrol car and taking to the public safety
building, over his objection, was a permissible extension of a

6

Terry stop.

In actuality, it was a de facto

arrest requiring

probable cause.
ARGUMENT
1. THE TROOPERS SEIZED MR. HELQUIST WITHOUT HAVING A
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS
AFOOT.
A. THE DISPATCH REPORT WAS CONCLUSORY AND WAS NOT
CORROBORATED BY TROOPER HALLTS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS.
In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the two prong test set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L.Ed 2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) to
determine whether a routine traffic stop can withstand
constitutional scrunity:
(1) Was the police officer's action
"justified at its inception"?
(2) Was the resulting detention
"reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place"?
(citation omitted) .
IsLuf 873 P.2d at 1131-32.
As to the first inquiry of the test, the trooper's action
was not justified at its inception.

There was no underlying

factual justification for the conclusion that Mr. Helquist was
driving under the influence.

The only factual information

provided was by an anonymous caller from Blue Mountain Foods who

7

stated that a male smelled strongly of alcohol, had been in an
argument at the store, and was in a small red car. No
information was given in support of the conclusion that he was
drunk, such as allegations that the individual had slurred
speech, bloodshot eyes, unsteady balance or was staggering,
etcetera.

There was no testimony as to the time that the call

was received by Dispatch and when the trooper's responded.
Moreover, Trooper Hall's observed Mr. Helquist when he
walked to his vehicle, got in and backed out of the parking
stall.

Trooper Halls noted absolutely no behavior consistent

with Mr. Helquist being "drunk".
In Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989),
the defendant drove by the scene of a traffic stop and stopped to
observe it.

The officer waved him on.

The defendant hesitated

momentarily before leaving at a slow rate of speed.

The officer

then followed the defendant who was driving twenty-miles-per-hour
in a forty-mile-per-hour zone.

The officer did not observe any

suspicious driving or any traffic violations (no traffic was
impeded).

Id. at 1012. This Court held that the stop was not

based on reasonable suspicion, holding that such suspicion "must
be based on articulated "objective" facts apparent to the
officer." Id^ at 1011

8

Here, there were no 'objective facts apparent1 to Trooper
Halls that Mr. Helquist was under the influence.
unremarkable:
balance.

His gait was

he was not staggering or exhibiting a loss of

Likewise, Mr. Helquist apparently had no difficulty

getting in his car, starting it, or backing it out of the parking
stall.

Finally, no traffic violations were observed.

That the trooper was responding to a tip does not
automatically give him the sufficient reasonable suspicion to
stop the vehicle, especially when the only testimony about the
time between receiving the tip and responding to it was
ambiguous.

Furthermore, the dispatch report lacked the necessary

factual basis to justify the stop.
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this
Court held without a factual basis, the officer lacked the
requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle.
Id. at 1280.
There, the arresting officer relied on a dispatch call to
investigate a specific location of a possible car prowl or car
burglary.

The suspect was described as "male with a chunky

build, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt".
1275•

Id. at

The officer stopped the defendant in the same area of the

possible car prowl or car burglary and the defendant fit the

9

description given by dispatch.

During the stop, the officer

smelled the odor of alcohol and the defendant was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
The trial court held that sufficient reasonable suspicion
existed on the basis of the following findings:

the dispatch

reported a alleged crime of a car prowl, a specific location for
the car prowl and a description of the suspect.

Id. at 1278.

This Court held that "the findings wholly fail to establish the
department's reasonable, articulable suspicion to issue the
"possible car prowl" bulletin."

Id.

Likewise, the information provided by the caller in the
instant case lacked the objective facts to justify the stop of
the vehicle.

All that the anonymous caller offered in support

of the conclusion that Mr. Helquist

was drunk was that he had

the odor of alcohol about him and he had been in an argument. No
objective information was offered in support of the conclusion
such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, staggering or unsteady
balance.

Furthermore, the caller failed to provide established
I
credibility or some other indication of reliability.
In State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992), this Court

upheld a stop of a suspected drunk driver on the basis of the
information provided to dispatch and the arresting officer's
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observations.

There, the defendant was at a hospital and was

observed by two security officers:

he got

"vocal" with a

hospital employee, his eyes were glazed, his speech was slurred,
he smelled strongly of alcohol and he had trouble standing. Id.
at 256.

One of the security officers followed the defendant out

to the parking lot and watched him get into a red Pontiac Fiero
where the defendant repeatedly try to start the vehicle, drove a
few feet before stalling and then jerked to a stop.

Id. at 256.

The security officers contacted dispatch with this information
and two police officers were dispatched to investigate. The
arresting police officer independently observed the following:
the defendant appeared to be having a hard time driving and his
driving was slow and jerky.

The stop was upheld:

Officer Bradford had reasonable suspicion to
make the stop of Roth's vehicle. Where, as
here, a reliable
source with
reasonable
suspicion based on articulable
facts
reports
the commission of an offense,
based on
relayed facts,
the dispatcher
communicates
the information
to police and the responding
officer's
own observations
corroborate
the
dispatch,
we find that reasonable suspicion
exists for the stop.
Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added)
The case at hand stands in sharp contrast to Roth. Here,
there is no indication of the reliability of the caller. There
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was no factual information given in support of the allegation
that Mr. Helquist was drunk other than he was in some type of an
argument with another person and smelled of alcohol.

There was

no description of the type of vehicle other than a "small red
car".

Other than this call, the officers had no reason to stop

and detain the Defendant.

Indeed, the Trooper Hall's

observations of Mr. Helquist absolutely failed to corroborate the
tip that Mr. Helquist was under the influence.

See also Layton

City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987)(Employee of Circle K
Store observed Defendant and reported him as intoxicated.

When

officer arrived, his observations corroborated tip that Defendant
was impaired.

The stop was upheld.)

B. THE TROOPERS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ANY PERMISSIBLE
DETENTION,
i
Assuming arguendo,

that the troopers could detain Mr.

Helquist, the detention must, nevertheless, be reasonable and
justifiable in scope to pass constitutional muster.
U.S. at 20.

Terry, 392

Even a momentary detention is not permissible

without reasonable suspicion and objective facts to justify such
detention.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-59, 64

L.Ed.2d 497, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980).

In the case at hand, the

troopers1 actions went beyond that which is authorized in a

12

"Terry" stop.
It is well established that a "Terry" stop is a "brief, onthe-spot stop on the street"-

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

209, 60 L.Ed. 824, 833, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979)1.

The investigating

officer is under an obligation to quickly confirm or dispel his
suspicions.

Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L.Ed. 229,

103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983)("an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop").

Transporting Mr. Helquist to the public

safety building exceeded the permissible limits of a "Terry"
stop.
Although the Court took judicial notice that the public
safety building was five blocks away from the stop, the Court
also recognized that there were other places, closer to the stop
where the field sobriety tests could have been performed.

That

the Court found the trooperfs actions in this case reasonable is
not sufficient to extend a "Terry" stop into anything longer than
an on-the-spot investigation:
[R]espondent urges us to adopt a multifactor

]

In Dunaway. the police officers unsuccessfully attempted to justify picking up a murder
suspect from his home, taking him to a police station and interrogating him on the basis that
it was an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion.
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balancing test of "reasonable police conduct
under the circumstances" to cover all
seizures that do no amount to technical
arrests. But the protections intended by the
Framers could all too easily disappear in the
consideration and balancing of the
multifarious circumstances presented by
different cases, especially when that
balancing may be done in the first instance
by police officers engaged in the "often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." A single familiar
standard is
essential
to guide police officers,
who have
only limited
time and expertise
to reflect
on
and balance the social and
individual
involved in the specific
circumstances
they
confront.
Id. 442 U.S. at 213-14, 60 L.Ed at 836 (citations and footnotes
omitted; emphasis added)
Thus, the detention in this case "lasted longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop".

State v.

Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), disagreed with
on other grounds, Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.3. The seizure of
Mr. Helquist was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

All evidence seized as the fruit of the unlawful

continued detention must be suppressed.

Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
14

2.

THE TROOPER'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED A DE FACTO ARREST.

Assuming arguendo

sufficient reasonable suspicion existed to

justify the investigatory detention and the detention was not
unreasonably delayed, the officers actions constituted a de

facto

arrest, absent a showing of probable cause.
A "Terry" stop would permit the officers to conduct a field
sobriety test at the scene, however anything beyond a brief and
narrowly-defined intrusion constitutes an arrest which must be
supported by probable cause.

See generally Dunway v. New York,

442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
The reasoning in Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1983) is applicable in the instant case.

There, the Utah

Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the administration
of field sobriety tests violated the defendant's right against
self-incrimination.

In holding that it did not, the Court stated

as follows:
Where the field sobriety tests were requested
and taken in a public street, no indicia of
arrest such as readied handcuffs, locked
doors or drawn guns were present when
defendant was asked to perform the tests, and
the length of performance of test was only
minutes, setting was not "custodial", even
though investigation had focused on the
accused•
IcL,
15

In the case at hand, the field sobriety tests were not taken
m

a public street and the indicia of arrest was present. Mr.

Helquist was placed in a patrol car by the trooper and taken,
over his objection, to the public safety building.

Such actions

are consistent with arrest and not with a brief, investigatory
stop.
An arrest is a "level three" seizure which requires
"probable cause to believe an offense has been or is being
committed".

State v. Dietitian, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)

quoting United Stated v. Merritt, 736 P.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.
1984).
At that time Mr. Helquist was transported, the facts and
the circumstances known to the officers did not rise to the level
of probable cause:

Trooper Hall's observations of Mr. Helquist

did not indicate that he was under the influence or impaired.
After stopping Mr. Helquist, Trooper Halls noted the odor of
alcohol and slurred speech.
of alcohol.

Trooper Randall noted only the smell

While this may have given the troopers a strong

reason to suspect that Mr. Helquist was impaired,

it did not

rise to the level of probable cause to arrest, especially in
light of Trooper Hall's earlier observations of Mr. Helquist.
£££

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14, 60 L.Ed at 836 ("common rumor
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or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' [is] not
adequate to support a warrant for arrest") (citations omitted)
The officer's claim that this was done solely for the
purpose of ensuring a fair field sobriety test is disingenuous:
the field sobriety test could have been done closer to the stop*
Finally, the DUI report form, written by Trooper Randall,
indicated that the search of the vehicle was done at the scene of
the arrest, "Blue Mountain Foods", Trooper Randall estimated the
time of the stop at being around 5:30, the same time that the he
wrote in the report that the arrest took place* Therefore, the
trooper openly admitted to making an arrest.
The arrest of Mr. Helquist was illegal under Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.

All evidence seized as the fruit

of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed.

Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress evidence*
DATED this c3 ^

day of April, 1996.
Respectfully submitted:
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JIE REILLY
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner were hand-delivered
to the Office of the San Jua^r^ounlv/ Attorney, at 297 South Main
in Monticello, Utah on th^6 2nd dayjof April, 1996.

ROSM^TE REILLY
*rney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM A: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides;
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddenIssuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable case supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall
issue but upon probable case supported by Oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1)(ii)(3)(a)(ii)(B) provides:
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that renders the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(B) had a person under 16 years of age in the vehicle at
the time of the offense.

ADDENDUM B: DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

R o s a l i e R e i l l y #6637
148 South Main #9
P o s t O f f i c e Box 404
M o n t i c e l l o , Utah 84535
(801) 587-3266

. iVEHTHD^Tr.CTXUv
r^nJ.r;C::r /
-'L^D JUL 3 1 1S95
CLilrtixOr t V . i J w u h j

Attorney for Defendant
LARRY HELQUIST

'3Y

^,
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IN AND FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY HELQUIST,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE; REQUEST
FOR HEARING
Case No, 9577-$7
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Defendant, Larry Helquist, by and through his attorney of record,
Rosalie Reilly, hereby moves this Court for an Order to suppress
all evidence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit:
1.

The observations of any police officer after the initial

automobile stop, including, but not limited to, the observations
made during the search of the vehicle, and/or of his person;

See

2.

Any statements attributed to Defendant; and

3.

All tangible evidence seized as the result of the search.

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).

Defendant further moves for a hearing on this matter•
DATED this ctfll^r

day of July, 1995
Respe

lly submitted,

R0£ALIE REILL1
itorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Craig Halls at^the Public Safety Building
located at 297 South Main, in Monpicellb,
Utah, on this 3^)^
day
of July, 1995.
^LIE REILLY
;orney for Defendant

ADDENDUM C: FINDINGS OF FACT

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San J u a n C o u n t y A t t o r n e y
P . 0 . Box 850
M o n t i c e l l o , Utah
84535
Phone 587-2128
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CLERK O F THE CGUBT

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SY.
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Depj:/

*

Plaintiff,

*

LARRY HELQUIST,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.
Criminal No. 95 57-11

Defendant(s).
This matter came on as a Motion to Suppress before the Seventh
Judicial District Court on the 5th day of September, 1995*

The

State was represented by the San Juan County Atrorney, Craig C.
Halls, defendant was present and represented by Rose Reilly.
The Court having received testimony of the witnesses does
hereby enter the following Findings of Fact.
1.

The incident giving rise to this action took place on the

7th day of January, 1995.
2.
3.

That day was a snowy stormy day in Monticello, Ut.
Employees of Blue Mountain Foods, a food store within

Monticello, Ut. contacted the San Juan County Sheriff's Office and
indicated that an individual later identified as Larry Helquist had
an

argument

intoxicated.

with

a

store

employee

and

was

The individual was with a child.

1

believed

to

be

4.

Store employees called the Sheriff's Office and requested

that the individual be stopped but asked that he not be confronted
in Blue Mountain Foods.
5.

The store employee described the person and also the car

in which he was driving as a small red toyota.
6.

Trooper Sanford Randall responded to Blue Mountain Foods.

Drove by the parking lot and observed there were only a couple of
cars in the lot and observed a red toyota vehicle.
7.

Trooper Randall went down to the end of the block to turn

around an became stuck.
8.

He radioed Sgt. Doug Hall that he would not be able to

check out the report until he could get out.
9.

Trooper Hall proceed to Blue Mountain Foods and found

Larry Helguist about to pull out of the parking lot in a small red
toyota car with a child.
10.

Officer Hall testified that when he approached Mr.

Helquist he could smell the odor of alcohol and that Mr. Helquist
had slurred speech.
11.

A short time later Trooper Randall came to the scene and

Officer Hall turned over the investigation to Trooper Randall.
12.

Trooper Randall could smell the odor of alcohol on the

breath of Mr. Helquist.
13.

The parking lot at Blue Mountain Foods was covered with

slush and snow and the Blue Mountain Foods person who had turned in
the complaint had ask that the individual not be confronted within
the store.
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14.

Trooper Randall because of the conditions of the parking

lot asked Mr. Helquist if he would mind going to the lobby of the
Public Safety Building, approximately

5 blocks away from Blue

Mountain Foods to perform field sobriety tests.
16. Trooper Randall and Officer Hall agreed that Officer Hall
would

stay at Blue Mountain Foods with the child and the car

pending the outcome of the field sobriety tests.
17.

The Court finds that the stop by Officer Hall was a level

two encounter.
18.

Field sobriety tests were performed by Officer Randall in

the public portion of the Public Safety Building, to wit: the
lobby,
19.

The Court finds that Mr. Helquist was not under arrest

when he was brought to the lobby of the Public Safety Building to
perform the field sobriety tests.
20.

Following

Mr.

Helquistfs

performance

of

the

field

sobriety test, Officer Randall radioed Officer Hall and indicated
that he was placing Mr. Helquist under arrest at which time Officer
Hall made arrangements to take the child home and have the vehicle
impounded.
21.

The Court finds that Officer's Randall and Hall by virtue

of the call made to the Sheriffs Office, and the description of
the

individual and his activities at Blue Mountain Foods had

reasonable suspicion to make the original stop and to do additional
testing to check whether the occupant was under the influence.

3

22.

The information that the individuals had together with

the performance on the field sobriety tests gave Officer Randall
probable case to make an arrest for DUI.
23.

The

Court

further

finds

that

Mr.

Helquist1s

transportation to the Public Safety Building was not consensual,
but he was asked by the officer to go to the Public Safety Building
to do field sobriety tests, that he was not under arrest, that
under the circumstances

on this day and given the weather in

Monticello at this time, it was not unreasonable for the officer to
ask Mr. Helquist to accompany him to the Public Safety Building to
perform the tests.
24.

Mr. Helquist was placed in the front seat of the patrol

trooper's vehicle, he was not handcuffed.

The indicia was arrest

were not present.
25.

The Court finds that it was the intention of the officers

that had Mr. ::^l~uist passed the field sobriety tests to return Mr.
Helquist to his vehicle at the Blue Mountain Foods.
26.

Mr. Helquist was subsequently given an intoxilyzer test

after he failed the field sobriety tests at the Public Safety
Building and was detained by the officer and placed under arrest
for DUI.
DATED this 7jr\Ji day of Octomber, 1995.
STATE OF UTAH
W
County of San Juan J

1

Jkd^t ~

LyJ^ R."Tenderson
District Court Judge

